This paper investigates the relationship between income and democracy using common correlated effects (CCE) extended estimators which take into account the fact that democracy variables are highly correlated across countries and the possibility of heterogeneous effects of income on democracy in different countries. Using a wider database than ever, covering annual data from 1804 to 2010 for almost all countries, we show that overall, the effect of income on democracy is significantly negative when the time-series features of the data are taken into account, a result that comes from the low-income countries. This calls back into question the controversy about the empirical effect of income on democracy.
Introduction
The interest of economists in the relationship between income and democracy is not new. However, the empirical approach to that relationship has not taken into account the correlated nature of the processes of democratization. Nevertheless, the idea that democracy is contagious, that democracy diffuses across the world map, is now well established among policy makers and political scientists alike (see e.g. Elkink 2011 ). There are plenty of examples in history. The French Revolution brought a wave of constitutional civil and political rights to European people and the American Revolution led to the independence of the USA. The independence of the USA then inspired most processes of independence in Latin America in the XIXth century. In the XXth century inter world wars period, the increase in the autocratic governments also seemed to be correlated in time (examples are the Iberian countries, Italy, Germany, Japan). Democratization of southern European countries in the post-second world war period followed in rapid succession (Greece in 1974 , Portugal in 1974 /1976 , Spain in 1975 . Independence of former European colonies in Africa happened essentially in the 1960s but were followed by the establishment of autocratic rulers in the newly formed African countries. The recent Arab Spring is an example of a change in the structure of power in Northern African and Middle Eastern countries coming on the heels of the 2010 Tunisian Revolution. Data on democracy (indexes) show that the number of countries with high democracy standards has increased over time but also show that there are waves of democratization and waves of autocratization ( Treisman 2011; Bonhomme and Manresa 2015) . These cross-border transmissions of ideals of democratization can be called winds of change. 1 Income growth and especially education have been seen as predecessors of democratization, a view summarized in well-known Thomas Jefferson's sentence "An educated citizenry is a vital requisite for our survival as a free people". This view is usually referred to as the Lipset/Aristotle hypothesis, which states that only nations with high income and low poverty can develop democratic ways of social organization ( Lipset 1959) . In fact, most well-known processes of democratic transitions were preceded by long periods of income rise (e.g. Portugal, Spain, Greece in the 1970s).
Ancient forms of democratic transitions have also occurred in relatively developed economies of their time (e.g. ancient Greece, the English Magna Carta, or the French Revolution). Some examples of the reverse causal link (from democratization to income growth or decline) can also be found in history (e.g. the American Revolution preceded a history of growth and development for the USA and the Arab Spring preceded -to date -a history of decline, uprising and war for the Arab countries). These examples call our attention to the importance Tiago Neves Sequeira is the corresponding author. ©2017 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston. of determining the correct causal relationship between democracy and income. Additionally, the experiences of different countries seem to indicate the channels through which the income determine (if so) democratization ought to be studied. Income may enhance education and more educated people may demand democratic rights. However, the increase in demand may also act through culture. Might education and culture act as separate determinants of the democratic processes? The presence of democratic aspects of life in relatively undeveloped nations such as the pre-colonization Iroquois or Ceylonese people suggests that determinants of democracies other than income may be present and that such determinants may vary across different countries.
The difficulty in measuring democracy delayed the empirical assessment of this relationship to the last years of the last century but eventually the construction of indexes of democracy enabled empirical analysis in a cross-section framework. The literature has focused on quantifying the influence of income in democracy, mostly studying a linear relationship between income and democracy. Most recent contributions highlight the role of time-fixed heterogeneity across countries (fixed-effects) and reverse causality, with the use of GMM estimators. However, most research still struggles with the scarcity of data to account for heterogeneity across countries and the important cross-dependence (time-varying) effects. We wish to contribute to fill those gaps using the widest database ever, with annual data from 1804 to 2010.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a literature review on the empirical assessment of the influence of income on democracy. Section 3 motivates the specification and the econometric approach. Section 4 presents the main empirical results and several extensions and robustness checks. Finally, Section 5 concludes. Barro (1999) initiated the empirical quest for the effect of income on democracy in a cross-country study including nearly 100 countries, between roughly 1960 and 1995. The authors use lags in the equation they estimate for variables linked with democracy in order to account for possible reverse causality from democracy to income. They also consider a complete set of other determinants of democracy such as schooling, education, gender inequality, urbanization, population, and many country dummies. His article shows a positive and statistically significant sign of income in the equation for democracy. Among other positive determinants of democracy are schooling, population size, and the share of middle class on income. Among negative determinants of democracy we can find gender inequality in schooling, urbanization rate, an oil country dummy, ethnolinguistic fractionalization, Muslim, Nonreligion, and Other religion fractions. However, the work from Acemoglu et al. (2005 Acemoglu et al. ( , 2008 casts doubts about a positive effect of income (and education) on democracy. With the use of fixed-effects and instrumental variables panel estimation, the authors found no significant effect of income on democracy. The non-significant results are confirmed when the authors analyze a longer time path from the beginning of the twentieth century, increasing the time-series observations to 25 and 50-year data. The authors argue that the possible source of a positive correlation between income and democracy may rely on roots even deeper in history, being consistent with the idea that societies embarked on divergent political-economic development paths at certain critical junctures. These works call ones' attention to neglected heterogeneity, in the form of omitted variables driving both income and democracy and in the form of specific country historically-rooted factors that determined different paths for the relationship between income and democratization. Acemoglu et al. (2005) results are questioned by Bobba and Coviello (2007) , as they correct for weak instruments and identify education as weakly exogenous. Castelló-Climent (2008) also presents a significant effect of education on democracy correcting for the same issues as Bobba and Coviello (2007) , but showing that an increase in the education attained by the majority of the population is what matters for the implementation and sustainability of democracy, rather than the average years of schooling. Also Moral-Benito and Bartolucci (2012) find evidence of a non-linear effect from income to democracy even after controlling for country-specific effects. In particular, their findings point to the existence of a positive effect only in low income countries. Boix (2011) shows that increasing the time period on which the relationship between income and democracy is observed (looking back to the early nineteenth century) a positive effect of income in democracy is again retrieved. This happens after controlling for fixed effects and endogenous income (through the use of instrumental variables). However, that article also shows that the effect of income on democracy depends to a large extent on different historical periods and income levels, again calling for heterogeneity in the relationship. Following a somewhat similar long-run logic, Treisman (2011) also uses long time series and concludes that the effect of income on democracy may differ according to different length of panel, pointing out that the medium length panels present the strongest results. Most recently, Murtin and Wacziarg (2014) also explored long historical data (from 1870 to the present), using 10 years as the length of the panel. They found that primary schooling, and to a weaker extent, per capita income levels are strong determinants of the quality of political institutions.
Democracy and income: a literature review
On the contrary, they find little evidence of causality running the other way, from democracy to income or education.
Thus far we have described past contributions that focused on dealing with causality and omitted variables issues, relying (only) on fixed-effects to allow heterogeneity among countries. There are a few recent attempts to deal with full heterogeneity among countries. While Cervellati et al. (2012) explore the effect of income on democracy in different groups of countries, Fayad, Bates, and Hoeffler (2012) use dynamic and heterogeneous panel data estimation techniques for the period between 1960 and 2007 and report a significant (but negative) effect of income on democratization. We differ from the latter in the length of the database (using data from 1804) and simultaneously take into account cross-section dependency in democracy (and income) series, allowing for heterogeneity in both the short-and the long-run, presenting results robust to (Granger-) causality, omitted common factors such as the evolution of ideas and movements toward democratization (winds of change), and differentiating effects in the rich countries from the ones in poor countries. The unique close attempt to deal with omitted common factors associated to winds of change is the empirical contribution of Bonhomme and Manresa (2015) , which develop and implement a grouped fixed-effect estimator. Results indicate that income has negligible influence in democracy index. However, despite the fact that groups are endogenously estimated in their approach, the model does not allow for different coefficients by country, i.e. our approach is not only robust to the winds of change but also allow that the winds blow differently from country to country.
Data, specification and methods
Data for democracy come from the Polity IV dataset ( Marshall and Jaggers 2008) , the main source used in the literature and the variable has been adjusted to be between 0 and 1, as is also common in the literature. This database includes annual data between 1800 and 2013 for 193 countries. We also use a less used alternative proxy for democracy from the Polyarchy database which includes annual data between 1810 and 2000 for 187 countries ( Vanhanen 2000) . There are considerable differences in how these alternative indexes measure democracy. The first is based on items that stand for democracy and items that count for autocracy. The final index is obtained by subtracting autocracy from democracy, yielding the polity index. The Polyarchy index is based on the notions of competition for political power and of participation in elections. The democracy index is then the product of the participation index multiplied by the competition index. They are seen as very different measures of democracy. Thus, obtaining the same qualitative results would be clear evidence of robustness. The per capita income measure comes from the Maddison Project ( Bolt and van Zanden 2014) . This database constitutes an update of the original Angus Maddison database and includes 182 countries and groups of countries with unbalanced data between 1 A.D. and 2010. The combination of these databases yields a final database which reaches each maximum extension with 154 countries and a maximum period from 1804 to 2010 (if democracy is measured by the polity index) or from 1810 to 2000 (if democracy is measured by the Polyarchy index). Table  1 presents descriptive statistics.
As shown by Eberhardt and Teal (2011) , with the presence of cross-country dependence, individual countries cannot be viewed as independent cross-sections, as has been assumed in almost all of the empirical literature reporting on the relationship between income and democracy.
2 Cross-section dependence can affect both inference and identification (see Bailey, Kapetanios, and Pesaran 2015 ; Pesaran 2015) . The most obvious implication of error cross-sectional dependence is that standard panel data estimators are inefficient and estimated standard errors are biased and inconsistent. However, error cross-sectional dependence can also induce a bias and even result in inconsistent estimates. In general, inconsistency arises as an omitted-variables bias when the observed explanatory variables are correlated with the unobserved common factors (see, e.g. Pesaran 2006) .
As if the historical examples such as the liberty winds spread by the French Revolution, the Independence of the USA, or the Arab Spring were not sufficient to argue for a high cross-section dependence of the democratization processes, we present evidence based on the cross-dependence test, from Pesaran (2004) , which tests the null of no cross-sectional dependence. A rejection of the test will thus be evidence for cross-section dependence. Results for tests of cross-sectional dependence for the democracy variable (polity) and per capita GDP are presented in Table 2 and they reject the null of no cross-section dependence. We may wonder if those results could be influenced by the presence of many European countries in which political regimes have historically been somewhat dependent (e.g. the influence of the French Revolution). The same argument may be applied to America (with the influence of the independence of the USA) or Africa (with the post-World War II independence movement). However, due to the lower weight of these continents in the database due to shorter available time-series, we would expect less influence of those cases on the result. To handle this issue we also performed tests of cross-section dependence by continents (shown in Table 3 ), and all of them reject the null of no crosssection dependence. In fact, continent by continent, there is also overwhelming evidence of no cross-sectional independence. Additionally, one may wonder if the result comes from considering many countries with the same institutional background. For this reason, we have also performed a cross-dependence test that excluded groups of countries with the same legal origin (e.g. a test which considered all the countries except the ones with British legal origin and then a test which considered all the countries except the ones with French legal origin; then excluding the countries with Scandinavian legal origin and then the ones with Socialist legal origin). All of these tests indicate a rejection of the null of no cross-section dependence. Thus, again the cross-country dependence of the democracy is not dependent on the legal background of the countries considered.
Another important issue that arises in panel databases with a large time-series dimension is non-stationarity of variables. This is another neglected feature of data in reported estimations. Appendix Table 11 shows results for a unit root test (from Pesaran 2007) that indicates evidence of non-stationarity in the income and democracy series. As Eberhardt and Teal (2011) observe, "The standard empirical estimators (e.g. fixed effects, difference and system GMM) not only impose homogeneous production technology, but they also implicitly assume stationarity, cross-sectionally independent, variables". We will use the Pesaran (2006) common correlated effects mean group estimator -augmented to be robust to reverse causality -to address our empirical objective. 3 One of the important features of this estimator in comparison to other panel data estimators is that it is robust to country-fixed effects such as geography and culture, and initial technology level, and to unobservable common variables such as common productivity change (TFP) and the common ideas about liberty and civil rights that spread quickly across political borders (which we call as winds of change). As (Granger-) causality is an important issue when evaluating the relationship between democracy and income, we estimate our model using an Error-Correction approach that allows us to distinguish between long-run effects and short-run effects of income on democracy. Contrary to what is reported in the literature on the issue, the quite larger time-series dimension we incorporate in our study allows us to follow the Error-Correction model (ECM) approach. This offers some advantages over restricted dynamic specifications such as those commonly found in the literature: (i) it distinguishes between the short and the long-run effects of income on democracy; (ii) the error-correction term can be investigated to determine the speed of democratic adjustment and (iii) cointegration can be tested in the ECM by closer investigation of the statistical significance of the error-correction term. The Error-Correction Model of the income-democracy relationship can be written as follows:
where D represents the democracy measure (e.g. the polity index) and y represents the natural log of per capita GDP. β ji represents the long-run equilibrium relationship between democracy and income, while γ ji represents the short-run relationship. f t represents the common factors that influence the evolution of democracy in different countries, such as an inspiring revolution, coup d'état or demonstration or the publication of an influential book. These are the factors that we term as winds of change. Although these are factors common to all countries, the influence in each country can be different as λ i (as well as γ i ) is a country-specific coefficient. Note that the model encompasses full heterogeneous effects of income on democracy across countries, which is an essential aspect of our approach. The estimated equation can thus be written as:
where (π 1i = ρ i . From the regression results long-run coefficients β ji in (1) can be recovered dividing the esti-
, which indicates the speed of convergence of the economy to its long-run equilibrium. Inference on the coefficient for the lagged democracy will provide insights into the presence of a long-run equilibrium relationship. If ρ i = 0 there will be no error correction and the model reduces to a regression with variables in the first-differences (the levels term in brackets in equation 1 drops out). If, on the contrary, ρ i ≠ 0, we observe error-correction, i.e. following a shock, the economy returns to its democracy long-run equilibrium path and thus there exists cointegration between the variables and processes in brackets. Following Pesaran (2006) and Banerjee and Carrion-i-Silvestre (2011) we add to eq. (1) cross-section averages of all variables in the model (GDP per capita and democracy) to replace unobservables as well as omitted elements of the cointegration relationship. However, as shown in Chudik and Pesaran (2013) , this approach is subject to small sample bias, especially in panels with time-series of moderate dimensions. Chudik and Pesaran (2013) offer an empirical strategy to deal with weakly exogenous regressors, which is thus robust to reverse feedback (from democracy to income in our case). They suggest, in addition to the cross-section averages mentioned above, the inclusion of further lags of the cross-section averages.
We follow Chudik and Pesaran (2013) rule of thumb to choose the number of lags to be introduced (p = T 1/3 ). Thus with a time series of around 65 years on average, that rule of thumb indicates a value of 4. In our ECM this equates to adding up to three lagged differences. We include three lagged differences in our benchmark regressions.
Empirical findings

Results: main specification
We estimate (2) and show the results in Table 4 . The first two columns use the main dependent variable -from the Polity IV dataset ( Marshall and Jaggers 2008) , with and without trend -and columns (3) and (4) show the results of regressions with an alternative dependent variable -from the Polyarchy dataset ( Vanhanen 2000) . Results in the Table indicate that we estimate regressions from a huge panel database with more than 9000 observations and an average of 64 time-series observations for 154 countries (the widest time series begins in 1804 and ends in 2010). This is the largest database ever used -considering both the time-series and the cross-section dimensions -to study the relationship between income and democracy. (7) ↗ (12)↘ (32) ↗ (35)↘ (9) ↗ (13)↘ (27) Sig. signs/countries for GDP per capita (short-run)
↗ (11)↘ (10) ↗ (8)↘ (14) ↗ (6)↘ (13) ↗ (4)↘ (16) Dependent variable is a democracy index defined in the first row of the There is evidence of error correction -the lagged democracy levels variable is highly statistically significant and negative, with implied half-lives of 2-5 years. In the first column the income variable is statistically significant at the 10% level in the long run -the GDP per capita in lagged levels -but not in the short run -the differenced lag of GDP per capita. This is partially consistent to what has been obtained for example by Murtin and Wacziarg (2014) , although with much lower coefficient value and statistical significance in our regression. The difference arises essentially by considering a much greater time-series variability than those authors did. However, when in column (2) we added a time trend to the specification, we obtain to a surprising result: GDP per capita is highly significant in both the long and short-run, but with a negative sign! This contradicts the Lipseyt's conjecture according to which the rise in income fosters democracy. In fact the opposite effect is obtained: as countries grow richer, democracy indexes tend to diminish. An intuitive explanation for this effect can be based on the incentives of elites to decrease participation and appropriate resources when income rises. This can occur for at least some range of income growth. We will test this hypothesis further below. When we consider the Polyarchy index we obtain a statistically significant and positive long-run coefficient of GDP per capita in the specification in column (3) consistent with some of the earlier reported results -Benhabib, Corvalan, and Spiegel (2011) obtain a positive link between income and democracy with this same variable, although with different methods. When including a trend in the specification, we again obtain the negative significant coefficient in the long run. The importance of the specification with trends rises with the increase in the time series dimension of the database. We note that trends in columns (2) and (4) are highly significant, so they should not be neglected. The significance of country trends may be linked to the importance of "the historical development paths", mentioned by Acemoglu et al. (2005) , 48. Quantitatively, results in columns (2) and (4) indicate that a 100 dollar increase in GDP per capita implies a decrease of 0.15 in the polity index of democracy (15% of the total possible variability) and a decrease of 5 in the polyarchy index of democracy (11% of the total possible variability). These are quite significant quantitative effects of rising income decreasing democracy.
Diagnostic tests on residuals show that they are stationary and the null of cross-section independence is clearly rejected for the first two columns. For regressions in columns (3) and (4) the cross-sectional dependence tests still reject. However when compared to tests on the dependent variable (the polyarchy index of democracy), they are much lower. 4 This is consistent with the result according to which the consideration of crosssection averages to deal with omitted variables and reverse causality also decreases cross-sectional dependence (see e.g. Eberhardt and Prebistero 2015) . Finally, the Wald test indicates the overall significance of the specification. Despite the existence of non-significant or significantly negative effects of income on democracy, this does not imply the absence of any significantly positive effects, but rather highlights the heterogeneity across countries. This heterogeneity can be observed when counting the number of positive and negative significant signs for income (short-run/long-run) which we depict in the last row of the Table. In those four regressions we use three lagged differences in our benchmark regressions following the rule of thumb suggested by Chudik and Pesaran (2013) . However, as this is based on an average of the number of time-series observations, we wish to test the sensitivity of the results to the number of lags. We therefore consider regressions with four lags lagged differences for cross-section averages. Results are in Table 14 , in the Appendix. As can be seen, the results are very consistent with those presented in Table 4 .
A possible intuition behind this negative influence may be found on the rise of political elites that occur with the rise of income. If this intuition comes to be true, this negative effect should be obtained in poor countries and not in the rich ones. We study this issue in the next subsection.
Di昀ferences between rich and poor countries
The literature has overlooked the possible different effect of income on democracy in rich and poor countries. It is reasonable to conjecture that the relationship between income and democracy is not linear across the income distribution. Boix (2011) argue that the effect of GDP per capita on democracy indexes decreases with GDP growth. In particular, those authors argue and present some evidence according to which above a given income level, the effect of income on democracy becomes negligible. Moral-Benito and Bartolucci (2012) , in one of the few papers that touch directly the issue, found the existence of a positive effect only in low-income countries.
Given that we have presented above results according to which the effect of income on democracy may be negative when a statistically significant time trend is considered, we wish to investigate whether this effect may come from the richer or the poorer countries. To this end, we have divided the sample of countries according to their average GDP per capita throughout the available period for each country. We consider as a threshold for dividing rich from poor countries the median log of annual GDP per capita of 7.80 (2443 US dollars). Then we re-run the regressions for each of the two samples. Table 5 shows results for the rich countries sample. In regressions without trend -columns (1) and (3), the positive and significant effect of GDP per capita on democracy is now stronger than in the whole sample. However, when including time trends, which are again highly significant, the effect of GDP per capita on democracy tends now to be statistically non-significant (and not significantly negative as before). Diagnostic tests point to the high significance of the specification and do not reject cross-section independence of residuals with the polity index as the democracy measure and still rejects when using the polyarchy index of democracy as dependent variable. Table 6 shows results for the poorer countries sample. Here the picture of results contrasts with the previous regressions in Table 5 . In fact, in regressions without a trend, non-significant results for GDP per capita prevail, i.e. the significantly positive effects obtained for the whole sample, in columns (1) and (3) without a trend -of Table 4 disappear, turning out to be non-significant in poor countries, with the exception of a negative short-run statistical significance of income in column (1) . However, when time trends are included, strong negative effects of GDP per capita show up. These are quite stronger results than those obtained for the whole sample. Quantitatively, results in columns (2) and (4) indicate that a 100 dollars increase in GDP per capita implies a decrease of 0.36 in the polity index of democracy (36% of the total possible variability) and a decrease of 11.8 in the polyarchy index of democracy (25% of the total possible variability), both in the long run. In column (2), short-run effects of income are also significantly negative. Thus, it becomes clear that the negative results obtained for the influence of GDP per capita on democracy obtained so far originate among the lowest income countries. This supports the interpretation according to which income growth in poorer countries may create the incentives to increase autocracy in order to appropriate returns of the ruling elites. Differently from the results for the whole and rich samples, now the cross-dependence test does not reject in the four regressions, pointing out that cross-section dependence is not affecting residuals. These results clearly contradict those in Moral-Benito and Bartolucci (2012) and show that the CCE approach we use in this paper is clearly highlighting different results from the existent approach that deals with neglected heterogeneity by the introduction of time-dummies in regressions. In both Table 5 and Table 6 , there is strong evidence for the error correction in the model -the coefficient of lagged democracy is negative and highly significant. Interestingly, this coefficient also implies faster adjustments in poorer countries than in richer ones. 
Sig. signs/countries for GDP per capita (short-run)
Dependent variable is a democracy index defined in the first row of the 
Dynamic threshold specification
Previous results on rich and poor countries subsamples call our attention to possible nonlinearities in this relationship. There are serious difficulties in reconciling nonlinearities with cross-section dependence, parameter heterogeneity and a dynamic specification within a panel of moderate to large time series dimension, such as the one we are using in this paper. This difficulty arises given that the order of integration of the square of an integrated variable -GDP per capita -is not defined within the linear integration and cointegration framework. In order to overcome this issue, we build on Eberhardt and Prebistero (2015) and present an asymmetric dynamic model seeking to evaluate the influence of low levels of income (growth) when compared to high levels of income (growth) on the democracy adjustment. We define partial sums of GDP per capita above and below zero, as follows:
This intends to represent the successive increases in income and the successive decreases in income, thus allowing us to evaluate their relative and potentially different effects on democracy. Thus, this setup suit the analysis of an asymmetric response of democracy to income rises or falls. Our error-correction model is now modified to include these partial sums of GDP per capita, as follows.
thereby considering the dynamic asymmetry in both the long and short run. Results for estimation of equation (6) are in Table 7 . The results show a negative influence of cumulative income (from below zero) ( − ) in democracy, supporting the evidence according to which the possible negative effect of GDP per capita on democracy depends on effects verified at low levels of GDP per capita. In fact, all coefficients for − are negative and significant and all coefficients for + are statistically non-significant. This main result is independent of introducing or not a time trend, despite the fact that overall, in these regressions time trends are non-significant. Short-run effects of cumulative sums in income from negative growth are also negative for regressions in which the dependent variabçle is the polity index. The qualitative results for diagnostic tests are maintained when compared with the analysis above.
These two analysis highlight that the negative effect of income on democracy, coming from low income levels, may be associated with the concentration of power on economic and political elites which goal is to increase power and thus autocracy. 
Robustness 4.2.1 Increased time-series dimension
A recent paper from Everaert and De Groote (2016) argues that the Pesaran (2006) estimator with homogeneous coefficients should be implemented for panel databases with large-T dimension, in order to avoid the small sample bias. Chudik and Pesaran (2013) show that the cross-sectional averages augmented common correlated effects (CCE) estimator (which we are using in all estimations in this paper) performs quite well in the presence of heterogeneous coefficients, weakly exogenous regressors and persistent factors, but can be affected by the time-series bias if T is small. In both papers, the bias affecting regressors (in our case, income) other than the lagged dependent variable (in our case the lagged democracy term in regressions) is just a proportion of the bias affecting the lagged dependent variable and, applying to our case, coefficients on income should not be affected by the time-series bias. While our average time-series dimension of 60 may be considered of medium dimension for the macro-data availability, there are some countries in regressions which enter with fewer number of observations. Thus, we wish to show robustness results that test the issue. To this end we restricted the database to the countries in which the time-series dimension allows for a minimum T = 50 in regressions. 5 Table 8 shows the results. These results dissipate our possible concerns with the time-series bias affecting the significance of the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable, as we can see high statistical significance of the Error-Correction (EC) coefficient throughout all regressions. It is worth noting that for the dependent variable from the polity database, the short-run negative effect of income on democracy is quite stronger and more significant than in the benchmark regressions (comparing with Table 4 ). The remaining results compare well with those in Table 4 , illustrating the robustness of our results to the time-series bias that could potentially affect those estimations. According to these results, quantitatively, results in columns (2) and (4) indicate that a 100 dollar increase in GDP per capita implies a decrease which amounts to nearly 9% of the total possible variability when using the democracy index from the polity database and a decrease representing 6% of the total possible variability if using the democracy index from the polyarchy database. Despite lower effects than those obtained from the whole database, these remain quite significant quantitative effects of rising income in decreasing democracy. (3) ↗ (8)↘ (20) ↗ (24)↘ (1) ↗ (7)↘ (10) Sig. signs/countries for GDP per capita (short-run)
↗ (5)↘ (6) ↗ (3)↘ (7) ↗ (4)↘ (6) ↗ (4)↘ (6) Dependent variable is a democracy index defined in the first row of the 
Human capital
There are several authors that concentrate their attention on the link between education and democracy and not on the link between income and democracy Bobba and Coviello 2007; Castelló-Climent 2008; Murtin and Wacziarg 2014) . Results are mixed as detailed in the literature review above with positive and significant effects of education being achieved once fixed-effects, weakly exogenous regressors and omitted variables are taken into account. In fact, in Murtin and Wacziarg (2014) , human capital was revealed as a relatively stronger determinant of democracy than income. However, parameter heterogeneity and cross-country dependence is completely absent from the literature when studying this relationship. In order to take those considerations into account, we will present some results in which we consider human capital (instead of income) as regressor in the equations for democracy. However, due to the fact that annual data on human capital cannot be obtained except for most recent time-series, we must rely on linear interpolation with 10-year periods to obtain annual data. To our knowledge, there are two sources for human capital which date back to the nineteenth century presenting data in 10-year intervals: (i) the first is Morrisson and Murtin (2009) -also used in Murtin and Wacziarg (2014) -who constructed an historical database on average years of schooling covering 74 countries since nearly 1870 and (ii) the second is from Baier, Dwyer, and Tamura (2006) -who present data for 123 countries since nearly 1870. While (i) combined data on total enrolments in primary, secondary and tertiary schooling with age pyramids, in order to calculate enrolment rates and the average number of years of schooling among the adult population, (ii) combined data on schooling and experience to construct the human capital index. Thus the main conceptual difference between (i) and (ii) is that the first associates human capital just with schooling and (ii) enlarges the concept with the consideration of labor market experience. We consider each of the two variables in regressions. Table 9 and Table 10 show the results. There is strong evidence of error correction in all regressions, as before. (4) ↗ (11)↘ (2) ↗ (33)↘ (1) ↗ (16)↘ (13) Sig. signs/countries for GDP per capita (short-run)
Dependent variable is a democracy index defined in the first row of the Table. Values in parentheses below coe昀ficients are p-values from robust (clustered) standard errors. Regressions include three lags of lagged di昀ferences of cross-section averages. Level of significance: ***for p-value < 0.01; **for p-value < 0.05; *for p-value < 0.1. Wald test is a joint significance test for the regressors. CD-test is a Pesaran (2004) cross-section dependence test on the null of cross-section independence done on the residuals from the regression (p-value presented in parentheses). In regressions of columns (1) and (2), the CD test cannot be computed due to high unbalanced panel. Stat-test is the Pesaran (2007) unit root test made on the residuals. This test used four lags and rejects I(1) means that in all lags the test of unit root rejects with and without trend. The list of countries that enter in regressions is available upon request. 
Dependent variable is a democracy index defined in the first row of the (2004) cross-section dependence test on the null of cross-section independence done on the residuals from the regression (p-value presented in parentheses). In regressions of columns (1) and (2) Results in Table 9 , column (1) indicate a long-run marginally significant positive effect of education on democracy. This is quite a lower significance than the one obtained in Murtin and Wacziarg (2014) . However, when using the polyarchy measure of democracy, the positive and highly significant influence of education on democracy -column (3) -is recovered. In this case there is a short-run negative and highly significant effect of education on democracy. All these effects disappear when a trend is included in the regression. In the regression in column (2) the trend is nonsignificant -in opposition to what has been obtained in previous regressions which included income as regressor. However, in column (4) the trend is again highly significant. In the context of this method, the non-significance of the trend does not mean that the trend is meaningless for some countries. Overall, even though we consider the trend only when it is significant, our preferred specifications indicate either a marginally significant positive effect of education in the long run (column 1) or non-significant effects of education in both the short and long run.
Results in Table 10 , in which human capital variable comes from Baier, Dwyer, and Tamura (2006) and includes labor market experience in its definition, recover the positive and significant results in the long run and negative and significant results in the short run -columns (1) and (3). Although these significant results disappear with the introduction of time trends, as these trends are non-significant, we may disregard these specifications as non-preferred ones.
Definitive results on the influence of human capital on democracy that take into account heterogeneous slopes as well as cross-sectional dependence, being simultaneously robust to omitted variables and reverse causality, may have to wait until long-run historical annual data on human capital are available -as is for GDP per capita.
Discussion
The discussion around the empirical relationship between democracy and income has been based on the use of allegedly more appropriate methods or specifications to adjust to existing data. In fact, Acemoglu et al. (2005 Acemoglu et al. ( , 2008 showed that for the post-II World War period and including fixed-effects and instrumental variables, the effect of income and education on democracy vanishes. However, some specification improvements ( Bobba and Coviello 2007 for the influence of education) and the enlargement of the considered historical period ( Boix 2011; Murtin and Wacziarg 2014) , recover the significant positive effect of income (and education) on democracy. Including considerations of cross-country dependence and heterogeneity and simultaneously controlling for omitted variables and reverse causality in a long historical time span, we present clear evidence of the diminishing effect of income on democracy and if we include time-trends (never considered so far), the influence of income on democracy comes out to be significantly negative.
In this section we discuss results from three alternative specifications that allow us to compare our results with previous literature on the issue and establish the added value of using the augmented CCE estimator in the analysis of the nexus between income and democracy. First, we estimate fixed-effect regression without and with time dummies using our enlarged database. Second, we analyze the effect of considering the more recent time span (from 1960) which allows us to compare our results with those in most of the literature (namely, Acemoglu et al. 2008 ). Third we compare our results with the ones in Murtin and Wacziarg (2014) , as we are using a comparable historical period and sources of data (some differences on sources are due to updates). Results for these three experiments are presented in Appendix (results are Table 15, Table 16 and Table 17 , respectively).
When estimating fixed-effects regressions using our dataset and the ECM approach, we obtain the statistically significant positive long-run effect obtained by some of the previous literature, and a statistically significant negative short-run effect. Previous literature account for common factors affecting the relationship between income and democracy using time-dummies (accounting for common shocks that affect every country in the same way). Thus one could wonder if this procedure would imply the same results that we obtain with the augmented CCE estimator. Appendix Table 15 show that this is not the case. In fact, when including time-dummies, the significance of income in predicting democracy diminishes (essentially in the long-run) but the sign of the long-run coefficient never switches to negative and with the Polyarchy Index as a proxy of democracy, statistical significant effects are maintained.
When applying our main specification to data after 1960 (Appendix Table 16 ) in order to make the considered time span comparable to most of the existing evidence, we obtain a pattern quite similar to what is described above (see Appendix Table 16 ). Contrary to the differences reported between authors that considered data after 1960 and authors that considered data from the earlier XIXth century (e.g. Acemoglu et al. 2005; 2008versusBoix 2011 Murtin and Wacziarg 2014) , we achieved similar quantitative results. In particular, we obtained significantly negative effects of income on democracy in both the long and short run (stronger in the former than in the latter) in specifications including highly significant country time-trends. The only discrepancy between these results and those using the longer time-span is the fact that in the case of post-1960 data, income is generally non-significant in specifications without a trend.
When comparing results from fixed-effects with the ones in Murtin and Wacziarg (2014) -Appendix Table  17 -we highlight that differences in results obtained in our paper are not due to substantial differences in data. In fact, data differences when compared to those authors depend only on updates on the sources' datasets.
6 On the contrary, differences in the results rely mostly on the fact that we are considering a more detailed time-series dimension and methods which incorporate country heterogeneity and dependence. Table 17 in the Appendix presents the results. Column (1) replicates the first regression in Table 4 in Murtin and Wacziarg (2014) , column (2) updates the polity series for the most recent update, which yield almost equal results (there are marginal changes in the coefficients not reported due to approximations of centesimal values). Column (3) updates not only the polity series but also the GDP per capita series using the most recent data. There are some changes due to the fact that a minority of countries have less reported data on the Project Maddison dataset than in the original Maddison project dataset. However, statistical significance of income remains high and overall, coefficients' values are well comparable to those in columns (1) and (2). Column (4) presents a regression with annual data (but without time dummies). Significance of GDP per capita as well as of lagged democracy continue to be high, although the coefficient on GDP is quite lower. However, the greatest difference appears when country time dummies are included. This eliminates the statistical significance of GDP per capita as a determinant of democracy. This experiment highlights that consideration of annual data (instead of longer time spans) has the capacity of changing the predicted influence of GDP on democracy. 7 However, these fixed-effects with timedummies estimates do not predict a significant relationship between income and democracy (nor positive or negative). An immediate criticism may be that annual data do not represent well the period of time that is relevant to evaluate the effect of income on the democracy. This is not the case, however, on our ECM approach, as we were able to use the richer time-series dimension to distinguish the long-run effects of income on democracy from its short-run effects.
Finally a concern may arise because some of our dependent variables may be bounded (especially from above), as the database may include mostly democratic countries and some that may have remained democratic (or autocratic) over all the period. As our ECM approach considers as the dependent variables the variations on those variables, this potential bias would only result from countries that have always remained democratic or autocratic (by other words, the democratic indexes may be always 1 or 0). To test the robustness of our results to this issue, we have excluded those countries from the regressions (the number of countries that lie on these cases is very small within this large historical period), and we arrived to similar results to those showed in Tables above both in what coefficients values and statistical significance are concerned.
Conclusion
Both democracy and development determine decisively the way of social organization and quality of life. The question if democracy and development are linked in some way is thus crucial in order to understand the process of human and social development. Several empirical attempts have been made to evaluate this relationship, with mixed results. In this study we concentrate on the influence of income on democracy (and not on the inverse relationship). In general, previous articles have concluded that once weak instruments and weakly exogenous regressors are taken into account, there is a positive influence of income on democracy. However, a controversy remains, according to which the relationship between income and democracy may result from common evolution in history and may be determined by critical junctures ( Acemoglu et al. , 2008 . There are still few contributions that allow for long-run historical analysis, and most concentrates on the post-II World War period. A remarkable exception is Murtin and Wacziarg (2014) .
Until now the allowance of heterogeneity among countries has relied only on fixed effects and the fact that democracy is cross-sectionally dependent (in a time-varying manner) has been essentially neglected in the literature. The only exception is Fayad, Bates, and Hoeffler (2012) , which however also concentrates on the post-II World War period, thus relying on a small time-series dimension. We fill this gap considering long-run historical analysis (from 1800 until 2010) and simultaneously considering methods consistent with full country heterogeneity and dependence on an error-correction framework.
Despite using standard data, our consideration of annual time-series data yields results quite different from those of earlier studies on the issue, namely those that deal with neglected heterogeneity by considering timedummies in a fixed-effects environment. In particular, the use of common correlated effects estimators augmented to account for reverse causality yield a marginally significant long-run positive sign for income when the whole sample of countries is included. However, when considering a (statistically-significant) time-trend in regressions, the influence of income on democracy comes out to be significantly negative in the long run. Quantitatively, a 100 dollar increase in GDP per capita implies a decrease of 0.15 in the polity index of democracy (15% of the total possible variability) and a decrease of 5 in the polyarchy index of democracy (11% of the total possible variability). These are quite significant quantitative effects of rising income in decreasing democracy. Thus, the consideration of "the historical development paths" within a common correlated effects framework (accounting for the political cross-borders winds of change) yields a robust and negative effect of income on democracy. This is confirmed through robustness tests on the specifications, including the change in the number of cross-section averages lags and the consideration of countries that enter in regressions with more than 50 years. The importance of including time-trends rises as we consider quite long time-series and in fact, timetrends that are revealed to be positive and highly significant. This may be interpreted as the importance of country-specific trends in the evolution of democracy that are determined by some critical junctures in history.
We have also presented evidence that this pattern arises essentially in poor countries, with a strong negative influence of income on democracy, once time trends are included. In rich countries, on the other hand, the effect of income on democracy is statistically non-significant in specifications that include country time-trends. These empirical results indicate that the statistical significant negative sign that occur due to low-income levels may indicate that the increase in income departing from low levels yields some concentration of power in some economic and political elites that demand higher levels of autocracy. On the contrary, for high income levels, further increases do not affect the level of democracy (non-significant signs). Thus, for rich countries, increases income is not a direct determinant of democracy and more or less democracy may arise solely for the incorporation of winds of change.
In specifications in which we consider human capital as determinant of democracy, the evidence obtained is mixed. When considering human capital data that relies only on years of schooling, the results almost mimic the ones obtained for income, yielding either marginally significant results or non-significant results. Nevertheless, when considering human capital that includes labor experience, the results suggest a positive influence of human capital on democracy.
Future research may rely on improved annual measures of human capital to better evaluate the influence of human capital on democracy indexes and on the relationship between inequality and democracy using the common correlated framework.
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